Kashmir: Paths to Peace

Robert W. Bradnock
King's College London & Associate Fellow, Asia Programme,
Chatham House

May 2010

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A project sponsored by Saif al Islam al Qadhafi

Directed by Robert Bradnock and Richard Schofield
King's College London

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Chatham House
10 St James's Square
London, SW1Y 4LE
T: +44 (0) 20 7957 5700
F: +44 (0) 20 7957 5710
www.chathamhouse.org.uk

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Robert W. Bradnock

About the author

Robert W. Bradnock is a visiting senior research fellow at King's College London and associate fellow at Chatham House. His current research focuses on geopolitics and environment in South Asia.

1 Introduction

This opinion poll was commissioned by Dr Saif al Islam al Qadhafi in May 2009 and administered in September-October 2009. This is the first poll to be conducted on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC) that has separated Indian and Pakistani controlled Kashmir since the UN-brokered ceasefire on 1 January 1949. The ongoing dispute has poisoned relationships between the two countries, led to thousands of deaths, and blighted the lives of millions of Kashmiris, and in the first decade of this century been a source of terrorist-led violence with a reach well beyond South Asia. The purpose of the poll was to establish current attitudes in Kashmir on both sides of the LoC to alternative scenarios for the resolution of the conflict. The poll took as its starting point the assumption that Kashmiri opinion represents a vital foundation for the region's political future peace and stability, and for wider global security.

Figure 1: Kashmir: the area of study



Methodology

Dr Robert Bradnock and Ipsos MORI designed the poll. Ipsos MORI administered the poll in conjunction with FACTS Worldwide, which conducted the fieldwork in India and managed Aftab Associates Pvt Ltd, which carried out the fieldwork in Pakistan. Interviews were carried out between 17 September and 28 October 2009, following a pilot survey in August 2009. On the basis of quota sampling, 3,774 face-to-face interviews were completed with adults aged over 16. Of the total respondents 2,374 were in 11 of the 14 pre-2008 districts of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The districts excluded were Doda, Pulwara and Kupwara. 1400 were in seven of the eight districts in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), the district of Neelum being excluded, along with Gilgit-Baltistan (the Northern Areas).

In India (J&K) quotas were set by gender, age, district and religion according to the known population profile of the region (taken from the 2001 Census). In Pakistan (AJK) quotas were set by gender, age and district. The age and district quotas reflected the known population in AJK according to the 1998 Census. However, given the difficulties in interviewing women in AJK, a quota of 70% men and 30% women was set to ensure that enough women were interviewed. Similarly, for practical reasons, the sample in both countries was predominantly from urban areas, but quotas were set to ensure that 40% of the sample in each country were from rural areas, and the district quotas were adjusted accordingly to account for this. A random selection procedure was used to select individual respondents. The data was weighted (by district, urban/rural, age and gender) to reflect the population profile according to the most recent Census on each side of the LoC. Questionnaires were administered in Dogri, Urdu, Koshur (Kashmiri) and Hindi.

2 Presentation of results

In this report the results are presented in the following form:

1. Aggregated for both sides of the LoC;
2. Disaggregated into AJK and J&K;
3. Further disaggregated into the individual districts of both AJK and J&K.

In the subsequent analysis the data are cross-tabulated by demographic characteristics: urban/rural, age, education, religion, and the personal importance of the dispute. The Appendix details the sampling tolerances that apply to the results in this survey.

Note: the figures in the tables represent the percentage of total respondents in each category. Some tables record questions where multiple answers are permitted. Rounding procedures sometimes result in totals greater or less than 100%. The base sample size for each area is as follows.

Table 1: Sample size by district

	Combined			AJK districts						
	AJK+J&K	AJK	J&K	Muzaffarabad	Mirpur	Bhimber	Kotli	Poonch	Bagh	Sudanhoti
Unweighted total	3774	1400	2374	496	157	142	120	194	185	106
Weighted total	3774	1019	2755	256	114	103	193	141	135	77

Table 1 cont.

	Jammu and Kashmir districts										
	Srinagar	Jammu	Anantnag	Udhampur	Baramula	Kathua	Leh	Punch	Rajauri	Badgam	Kargil
Unweighted total	350	457	325	206	316	159	50[1]	114	137	210	501
Weighted total	408	537	397	251	397	187	39	127	163	212	39

1 Small base, so care must be taken in interpretation

3 Perceptions of key problems

How important is the dispute to Kashmiris?

An overwhelming 80% of Kashmiris felt that the dispute was very important for them personally – 75% in AJK and 82% in J&K. A further 11% of all Kashmiris felt that the dispute was fairly important. Only in two districts, Kathua in Jammu Division and Sudanhoti in AJK, did less than 50% feel that the dispute was very important to them personally.

Table 2: Q 'How important for you personally is the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir?'

	Combined %			AJK districts %						
	AJK+J&K	AJK	J&K	Muzaffarabad	Mirpur	Bhimber	Kotli	Poonch	Bagh	Sudanhoti
Very important	80	75	82	75	74	75	84	64	92	40
Fairly important	11	23	7	24	22	17	16	34	6	59
Not very important	6	1	8	1	2	8	0	1	1	1
Not important at all	1	*	1	*	2	0	0	1	*	0
Refused	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don't know	1	*	1	*	*	1	0	0	*	*
Very/Fairly	91	98	89	99	96	91	100	98	98	99

Table 2 cont.

	Jammu and Kashmir districts %										
	Srinagar	Jammu	Anantnag	Udhampur	Baramula	Kathua	Leh*	Punch	Rajauri	Badgam	Kargil*
Very important	91	62	95	80	99	34	66	89	79	98	90
Fairly important	6	17	2	2	1	13	22	9	9	0	*
Not very important	1	18	2	15	0	35	6	0	2	0	9
Not important at all	1	1	*	0	0	9	1	0	0	1	0
Refused	1	0	0	0	0	5	0	1	10	1	0
Don't know	*	2	0	3	0	4	6	0	0	1	*
Very/Fairly	97	79	97	82	100	47	88	99	87	98	91

Note: In all the tables an asterisk (*) indicates <0.5%

Figure 2: The personal importance of the Kashmir dispute

Proportion who believe that the dispute is *very important* for them personally



Q 'What do you think are the main problems facing people in Jammu and Kashmir/Azad Kashmir these days?'

For a very large majority of the population (81%) unemployment was thought to be the most significant problem faced by Kashmiris (66% in AJK and 87% in J&K). Government corruption (22% AJK and 68% J&K), poor economic development (42% AJK, 45% J&K), human rights abuses (19% AJK, 43% J&K) and the Kashmir conflict itself (24% AJK, 36% J&K) are all given as main problems.

Figure 3: Main problems: unemployment

Main problems facing Kashmir: proportion identifying unemployment



Figure 4: Main problems: government corruption

Main problems facing Kashmir: proportion identifying government corruption



Table 3: Q 'What do you think are the main problems facing people in Jammu and Kashmir/Azad Jammu and Kashmir these days?'

	Combined %			AJK districts %						
Top answers	AJK+J&K	AJK	J&K	Muzaffarabad	Mirpur	Bhimber	Kotli	Poonch	Bagh	Sudanhoti
Unemployment	81	66	87	51	71	34	94	71	66	74
Govt. corruption	56	22	68	23	21	42	36	8	8	7
Poor econ. development	44	42	45	36	45	43	65	36	38	15
Human rights abuses	37	19	43	23	13	32	31	8	12	5
Kashmir conflict	33	24	36	24	24	31	28	18	22	22

Table 3 cont.

	Jammu and Kashmir districts %									
Top answers	Srinagar	Jammu	Anantnag	Udhampur	Baramula	Kathua	Leh	Punch	Rajauri	Badgam	Kargil
Unemployment	96	80	98	48	94	82	55	95	96	95	87
Govt. corruption	70	76	62	59	68	73	47	92	72	54	36
Poor econ. development	37	51	38	23	42	88	16	56	75	26	7
Human rights abuses	87	3	73	6	88	8	18	2	5	55	42
Kashmir conflict	43	38	28	47	24	65	13	60	39	13	9

Note: Multiple answers permitted

Figure 5: Main problems: human rights abuses

Main problems facing Kashmir: proportion identifying human rights abuses



Figure 6: Main problems: lack of progress

Main problems facing Kashmir: proportion identifying lack of progress in solving the political conflict over Kashmir



4 Attitudes to the political process

In many districts there was widespread awareness that India and Pakistan were engaged in talks to resolve the dispute, but a very low level of detailed knowledge. Overall, three people in four were aware of some talks being held, but only a few, 6%, that they had started in 2003. Nearly half, 47%, of those aware of the talks felt the talks had increased their safety – 30% in AJK and 55% in Indian J&K. A similar proportion (48%) felt the talks had improved the chances of peace.

Table 4: Q 'Which, if any, of the things on this card comes closest to your view?'

	Combined %			AJK districts %						
	Total	AJK	J&K	Muzaffarabad	Mirpur	Bhimber	Kotli	Poonch	Bagh	Sudanhoti
India and Pakistan started talks in 1947/1951	24	39	17	38	44	74	23	37	40	30
Talks started in 2003	6	5	7	6	*	0	14	2	2	9
Talks started in another year	7	8	7	6	6	7	14	4	13	2
Aware of talks but not date	38	34	40	33	39	11	45	39	42	15
Not aware of talks	7	7	6	4	5	1	3	14	*	40
Refused	*	1	*	*	1	2	2	0	*	0
Don't know	18	6	23	14	5	5	0	4	3	5

Table 4 cont.

	Jammu and Kashmir districts %										
	Srinagar	Jammu	Anantnag	Udhampur	Baramula	Kathua	Leh	Punch	Rajauri	Badgam	Kargil
Talks started in 1947/1951	1	34	0	32	*	13	13	57	63	*	13
Talks started in 2003	11	5	8	3	4	9	31	6	2	4	28
Talks started in another year	2	10	1	8	*	22	3	24	14	1	5
Aware of talks but not date	51	30	65	21	43	53	0	11	10	57	*
Not aware of talks	5	13	1	30	*	*	0	0	0	2	0
Refused	1	*	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Don't know	29	7	26	7	52	2	53	3	12	36	53

Figure 7: Awareness of India-Pakistan talks on Kashmir

Proportion aware of India-Pakistan talks over Kashmir



Figure 8: The effect of talks on personal safety

Proportion who feel more safe as a result of India-Pakistan talks



Figure 9: The effect of talks on prospects for peace: much better

Proportion who believe that India-Pakistan talks make the prospects of peace *much better*



Figure 10: The effect of talks on the prospects for peace: better

Proportion who believe that India-Pakistan talks have made the prospects of peace *better*



5 Attitudes to National and State elections

Just over half of the population in J&K thought the State Assembly elections (2008) and the Lok Sabha elections (2009) had improved the chances of peace (52% and 55% respectively). In AJK only 41% thought that the elections for the Pakistan National Assembly (2008) had improved the chances of peace, while even fewer (34%) thought the same about the Assembly elections in AJK (2006). Many therefore see the electoral process on both sides of the LoC as having some contribution to make to resolve the conflict, but many remain to be convinced.

Figure 11: Indian Lok Sabha elections (2009) and the prospects for peace

Proportion in Jammu & Kashmir who believe India's Lok Sabha elections improved the chances of permanent peace



Militant violence

Just over a third, 36% in total across both sides of the LoC, believed that militant violence would be less likely to solve the Kashmir dispute, compared with nearly a quarter, 24%, who thought it would be more likely to. In J&K only 20% thought militant violence would help solve the dispute, compared to 39% who thought it would make a solution less likely. However, in AJK 37% thought militant violence would be more likely to solve the dispute, against 31% who thought it would make a solution less likely. Overall 34% thought militant violence would make no difference to finding a solution, 30% in AJK and 36% in J&K.

Figure 12: Pakistan National Assembly elections (2008) and the prospects for peace

Proportion in Azad Jammu & Kashmir who believe the Pakistani National Assembly elections improved the chances of permanent peace



Table 5: Q 'Do you think that violence, as advocated by some militant groups, is more, or less, likely to solve the Kashmir dispute, or will it make no difference?'

	Combined %			AJK districts %						
	AJK+J&K	AJK	J&K	Muzaffarabad	Mirpur	Bhimber	Kotli	Poonch	Bagh	Sudanhoti
More likely	24	37	20	31	31	25	24	47	50	71
Less likely	36	31	39	38	28	21	36	21	34	22
No difference	34	30	36	28	40	54	38	26	15	4
Refused	1	1	1	1	*	0	2	1	0	1
Don't know	4	1	5	2	*	*	*	5	1	1
Net difference[a]	-12	+6	-19	-7	+3	+4	-13	+25	+16	+49

Table 5 cont.

	Jammu and Kashmir districts %										
	Srinagar	Jammu	Anantnag	Udhampur	Baramula	Kathua	Leh	Punch	Rajauri	Badgam	Kargil
More likely	14	34	2	55	2	68	2	6	1	4	*
Less likely	27	51	40	30	19	6	11	94	99	33	5
No difference	51	13	55	8	65	24	73	*	0	52	79
Refused	2	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	*	0
Don't know	5	1	2	5	13	0	14	0	0	11	16
Net difference[a]	-13	-16	-37	+25	-17	+62	-9	-88	-98	-29	-5

a The net difference is the difference between the two categories 'more likely' and 'less likely'.

Figure 13: Militant violence as a solution – more likely

Proportion who believe that militant violence will make a solution to the Kashmir dispute *more* likely



Figure 14: Militant violence as a solution to the Kashmir dispute – less likely

Proportion who believe that militant violence will make a solution to the Kashmir dispute *less* likely



6 Options for the political future

Respondents were asked if they were given the choice in a vote tomorrow, which **ONE** option would they vote for:

- Kashmir on both sides of the LoC to become independent?
- To join India?
- To join Pakistan?
- The LoC to be made an international border?
- India and Pakistan to have joint sovereignty over Kashmir?
- No change in the status quo?

The results show an overwhelming wish for change and a resolution of the dispute. Less than 1% in either AJK or J&K said that they would vote for no change and to keep the status quo. But beyond that the options throw up mixed results.

For the whole of Kashmir to be independent

More than four in ten, 43%, of the total adult population said they would vote for independence for the whole of Kashmir, 44% in AJK and 43% in J&K. The preference for independence was fairly uniform across the districts in AJK but it was very unevenly distributed in J&K:

- Kashmir Valley Division – between 75% and 95%.
- Jammu Division – nobody in Punch, Rajauri, Udhampur and Kathua, and in Jammu only 1%.
- Ladakh Division – Leh 30%, Kargil 20% (both with a small sample size).

For the whole of Kashmir to join India

- 21% said they would vote to join India, but the voting intention was predictably split, both between AJK and J&K and within J&K.
- AJK: 1% said they would vote to join India.
- J&K: 28% said they would vote to join India.

However, J&K showed very wide variations between districts:

- Kashmir Valley Division – from 2% in Baramula to 22% in Anantnag.
- Jammu Division – from 47% in Jammu to 73% in Udhampur. However, Punch and Rajauri stood out with 6% and 0% respectively.
- Ladakh Division – 67% in Leh and 80% in Kargil.

Figure 15: The vote for independence

Proportion who would vote for the whole of Kashmir to become independent



Figure 16: The vote to join India

Proportion who would vote for the whole of Kashmir to join India



For the whole of Kashmir to join Pakistan

Voting intentions were also heavily split.

- AJK: 50% said they would vote for the whole of J&K to join Pakistan, with 64% in Bagh the highest level of support.
- J&K: 2% said they would vote to join Pakistan. In six districts no one said they would vote to join Pakistan. In the Vale of Kashmir, the only region with anyone intending to vote to join Pakistan, the highest proportions, 6% and 7%, were in Srinagar and Badgam districts.

Figure 17: The vote to join Pakistan

Proportion who would vote for the whole of Kashmir to join Pakistan



These two options – for the whole of Kashmir to join either India or Pakistan – are the only two options that were envisaged under the UN resolutions proposing a plebiscite in 1948/49. Yet there is no evidence that either joining India or joining Pakistan would come close to obtaining more than a quarter of the total vote. Moreover, as indicated above, such intention as there is to vote for either option is heavily polarized. 1% in AJK say they would vote to join India. Only 28% in J&K indicated an intention to vote to join India. But that 28% is itself polarized. In the Vale of Kashmir Division support for joining India ranged from 2% to 22%. In only four of the districts (Kargil, Leh, Kathua and Udhampur) did a majority say they would vote to join India.

There is even less support across the whole of Kashmir for joining Pakistan. In AJK the intention to vote for this option is just 50%. In J&K it is 2%.

This poll, in common with the two preceding polls in Indian Jammu and Kashmir, shows that, setting aside all other political obstacles, it is difficult to see how the plebiscite proposed in the UN resolutions of 1948/49 could play any part today in the resolution of the dispute.

However, there is no clear majority in prospect for independence either. In J&K there is a majority in favour of outright independence for the whole of Kashmir in only four districts, all in Kashmir Valley Division. In five further districts support for independence is 1% or less.

Alternative scenarios

Making the LoC into a permanent border received the vote of 14% and was the preferred option for nearly all of those in Punch and Rajauri. In the other districts of AJK and J&K hardly any would prefer this as an option, with the exception of Jammu and Udhampur where those who prefer it are still in the minority. Thus while in all the other districts there is a measure of support for reuniting Kashmir, albeit under sometimes completely incompatible scenarios, in Punch and Rajauri the population clearly would reject outright any reuniting of Kashmir.

The remaining options received minimal support. Joint sovereignty attracted a total voting intention of just 2%, the status quo less than 1%. The total lack of voting intention for the status quo indicates how the overwhelming majority of Kashmiris would vote for an alternative political scenario to that which prevails today; it was the one option upon which virtually everyone agreed.

Figure 18: Proportion in favour of status quo

Proportion who would vote for no change in the status quo



Table 6: Q 'If you were given the choice in a vote tomorrow, which one of these, if any, would you vote for? Kashmir on both sides of the LoC to become independent/join India/ join Pakistan/LoC made a permanent international border/India and Pakistan to have joint sovereignty for foreign affairs and whole of Kashmir to have autonomy over internal affairs/ India and Pakistan to have joint sovereignty for foreign affairs with local control (at State level) over internal affairs/ no change?'

	Combined %			AJK districts %						
	Total	AJK	J&K	Muzaffarabad	Mirpur	Bhimber	Kotli	Poonch	Bagh	Sudanhoti
Independence	43	44	43	43	47	47	42	58	31	45
To join India	21	1	28	3	0	*	1	0	1	0
To join Pakistan	15	50	2	51	46	42	52	39	64	55
LoC to be permanent	14	1	19	1	1	5	0	0	3	*
Joint sovereignty[a]	1	2	1	2	5	6	1	*	*	0
Joint sovereignty[b]	1	*	1	*	*	0	0	*	0	0
Status quo to be maintained	*	*	*	0	0	0	0	2	1	0
Refused	1	1	1	*	*	*	4	*	1	0
Don't know	4	*	5	*	*	0	0	0	0	0

Table 6 cont.

	Jammu and Kashmir districts %										
	Srinagar	Jammu	Anantnag	Udhampur	Baramula	Kathua	Leh	Punch	Rajauri	Badgam	Kargil
Independence	82	1	74	0	95	0	30	0	0	75	20
Join India	8	47	22	73	2	63	67	6	0	10	80
Join Pakistan	6	*	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	7	0
LoC to be permanent	0	39	0	14	0	3	2	94	100	1	0
Joint sovereignty[a]	1	2	0	0	*	12	0	0	0	0	0
Joint sovereignty[b]	0	3	*	4	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Status quo to be maintained	*	*	0	*	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Refused	2	*	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	*	0
Don't know	1	8	1	7	2	29	0	0	0	7	0

a The full question was: Joint sovereignty for India & Pakistan over foreign affairs + autonomy for whole of Kashmir for internal affairs
b The full question was: Joint sovereignty for India & Pakistan over foreign affairs + local control over internal affairs

7 The Line of Control

The LoC is an almost complete barrier to movement. 8% of the respondents claimed to have friends or family living on the other side of the LoC but only 1% of the total population had visited in the last five years. Less than 5% knew anyone who had crossed the LoC in the last five years.

Figure 19: Visitors to other side of LoC

Proportion who have visited/know someone who has visited the other side of the Line of Control in the last five years



Respondents were asked a series of questions about their attitudes to the Line of Control. Attitudes were nuanced. Overall, a majority of the total population, 58%, were prepared to accept the LoC as a permanent border if it could be liberalized for people and/or trade to move across it freely, and a further 27% were in favour of it in its current form. Only 8% said they were not in favour of the LoC becoming a permanent border in any form – 7% in AJK and 9% in J&K, with the highest level of opposition in Anantnag District at 14%, in J&K and in Bagh District, at 18%, in AJK.

There is widespread opposition to the requirement for a permit or passport to cross the LoC. Only 43% support Kashmiris having to use permits or passports – 57% in AJK and 38% in J&K. In J&K support is strongest in Jammu and Ladakh Divisions (as high as 80% in Kathua and 84% in Leh), and weakest in Kashmir Valley Division (between 10% and 41%).

Figure 20: Acceptance of liberalized Line of Control

Proportion in favour of the Line of Control if people and trade could move freely across it



Table 7: Q 'Which, if any, of these, comes closest to your view about the Line of Control as a permanent border between India and Pakistan?'

	Combined %			AJK districts %						
	AJK+J&K	AJK	J&K	Muzaffarabad	Mirpur	Bhimber	Kotli	Poonch	Bagh	Sudanhoti
LoC										
In favour of LoC in its current form	27	22	29	22	17	4	38	28	21	5
In favour if people & trade could move across freely	36	18	43	15	18	12	25	20	20	10
In favour if people could move across freely	11	23	7	30	39	21	11	21	22	10
In favour if trade could move across freely	10	29	3	28	13	51	23	24	19	72
Not in favour in any form	8	7	9	5	8	13	2	7	18	*
None of these responses	1	1	2	0	5	*	0	*	*	1
Refused	*	*	*	0	*	0	0	*	1	0
Don't know	6	*	8	*	*	0	*	*	*	1
NETS										
All in favour	85	92	82	95	87	87	98	93	81	97
In favour if people could move freely	47	41	50	45	58	32	37	41	42	20
In favour if trade could move freely	46	47	46	43	31	63	48	44	38	82
In favour if people or trade could move freely	58	70	53	73	71	83	59	65	60	92

Table 7 cont.

	Jammu and Kashmir districts %										
	Srinagar	Jammu	Anantnag	Udhampur	Baramula	Kathua	Leh	Punch	Rajauri	Badgam	Kargil
LoC											
In favour of LoC in its current form	1	44	11	51	1	59	5	93	90	1	0
In favour if people & trade could move across freely	77	12	67	6	75	11	54	0	0	69	85
In favour if people could move across freely	1	17	1	4	4	12	21	5	9	3	15
In favour if trade could move across freely	4	6	1	5	1	10	1	0	0	1	0
Not in favour in any form	11	8	14	13	8	1	10	1	1	9	0
None of these responses	*	2	1	10	1	*	0	0	0	1	0
Refused	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
Don't know	5	11	4	11	11	6	9	0	0	14	0
NETS											
All in favour	83	79	81	66	81	93	81	99	99	74	100
In favour if people could move freely	78	29	68	10	79	23	74	5	9	72	100
In favour if trade could move freely	81	18	68	11	76	21	55	0	0	70	85
All in favour if people or trade could move freely	82	35	69	15	80	33	76	5	9	73	100

Figure 21: In favour of the LoC in its present form

Proportion in favour of retaining the Line of Control in its present form



Table 8: Q 'Do you support or oppose Kashmiris needing a permit or passport to cross the Line of Control?'

	Combined %			AJK districts %						
	AJK+J&K	AJK	J&K	Muzaffarabad	Mirpur	Bhimber	Kotli	Poonch	Bagh	Sudanhoti
Strongly support permits	33	38	31	47	30	44	52	22	33	16
Tend to support permits	10	18	7	23	16	16	5	22	15	44
Neither support nor oppose	5	11	3	5	17	24	5	20	4	21
Tend to oppose	7	3	9	1	3	2	1	5	5	5
Strongly oppose	38	28	41	22	34	14	34	32	43	14
Refused	1	1	*	1	0	0	1	*	*	*
Don't know	6	*	8	1	*	0	*	*	0	*
Net difference[a]	-2	+26	-12	+47	+9	+44	+22	+7	0	+42

Table 8 cont.

	Jammu and Kashmir districts %										
	Srinagar	Jammu	Anantnag	Udhampur	Baramula	Kathua	Leh	Punch	Rajauri	Badgam	Kargil
Strongly support permits	24	41	31	66	6	68	52	23	7	12	43
Tend to support permits	7	2	9	1	4	12	32	13	11	7	34
Neither support nor oppose	2	4	2	3	2	6	8	1	*	2	10
Tend to oppose	7	11	9	16	10	10	3	0	1	10	3
Strongly oppose	54	39	40	9	51	2	2	64	81	49	2
Refused	1	*	0	*	0	2	0	0	0	2	0
Don't know	8	2	8	5	27	1	2	0	0	18	8
Net difference[a]	-29	-6	-8	+41	-51	+68	+79	-29	-64	-40	+72

a The net difference is the difference between the two categories support and oppose.

8 Attitudes to security

1 Just over three people in four (76%) support the removal of all mines on both sides of the LoC (81% in AJK and 75% in J&K). In J&K support for removal is strongest in the Kashmir Valley Division and along the LoC itself in Punch and Rajauri.

Figure 22: Support for the removal of all mines

Proportion who support the removal of all mines from both sides of the Line of Control



2 Even more strikingly, 56% say they would support the removal of all weapons from both sides of the border (71% in AJK and 50% in J&K). In J&K there are wide variations between districts in support for the removal of weapons. In the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh support for their removal runs typically at or over 80%, while in Jammu Division support is well below 20%, with the exception of Jammu itself where it stands at 21%.

Figure 23: Support for the removal of all weapons

Proportion who support the removal of all weapons from both sides of the Line of Control



3 It is widely believed that the withdrawal of both Indian and Pakistani security forces would help bring a solution. Two-thirds (66%) in J&K think the removal of Indian security forces will help bring peace, though there is a gulf between Kashmir Valley Division (around 90%) and parts of Jammu and Ladakh Divisions. In Kathua and Udhampur 1% and 8% respectively think it will help, and in Leh and Kargil about 40% do. In AJK 78% think the withdrawal of Indian troops will speed peace. But 52% in AJK also think the withdrawal of Pakistani security forces will improve the chances of peace, while in Indian J&K the figure rises to 82%. In J&K this belief is around 80% in most districts except Ladakh Division (around 50%) and Baramula (59%).

Figure 24: Will the withdrawal in Indian security forces help bring peace?

Proportion who support the withdrawal of Indian security forces from Jammu & Kashmir



Figure 25: Will the withdrawal of Pakistani security forces help bring peace?

Proportion who support the withdrawal of Pakistani security forces from Azad Jammu & Kashmir



An end to all militant activity is also seen as very important. In J&K, 77% of the population think an end to militant violence will help to bring a solution – highest in Kashmir Valley Division, but strong everywhere except Punch and Rajauri, where the overwhelming majority do not believe that this holds the key to resolution.

Figure 26: Will an end to militant violence help to end the conflict?

Proportion who believe that an end to all militant violence in Kashmir will help to end the conflict over Kashmir



4 Following a question asked in the 2008 Peace Poll,[1] held in J&K alone, this survey asked whether people believe that war would provide a solution. Overall one in four thought war could solve the dispute. 40% supported this view in AJK. In the J&K districts of Jammu (46%), Udhampur (78%) and Kathua (82%), there was an even stronger view that war would help bring a solution, but it was profoundly opposed in the Vale of Kashmir, Punch and Rajauri and Ladakh Division, where support was 3% or less.

1 Dr Colin Irwin, *Peace in Kashmir: Myth and Reality*, Institute of Irish Studies, University of Liverpool and TeamC Voter, Noida, India, June 2008.

Figure 27: Will going to war over Kashmir help to end the conflict?

Proportion who believe that going to war will help to end the conflict over Kashmir



5 Three-quarters of the population believe that bringing all sides of Kashmiri political opinion into talks will help to resolve the dispute – 73% in AJK and 77% in J&K. The majority support this view in almost all the districts of J&K and AJK.

Figure 28: Should all sides of Kashmiri political opinion be consulted?

Proportion who believe that all Kashmiri political opinion should be consulted in negotiations to end the conflict in Kashmir



Table 9: Q. 'Would you support or oppose the removal of all mines/all weapons from both sides of the LoC?' Q. 'Please tell me whether or not you think the following will help to bring a solution to the conflict over Kashmir.'

Note: Multiple answers were permitted to this question.

	Combined %			AJK districts %						
	AJK+J&K	AJK	J&K	Muzaffarabad	Mirpur	Bhimber	Kotli	Poonch	Bagh	Sudanhoti
Support removal on both sides of LoC										
All mines	76	81	75	91	81	73	54	85	90	97
All weapons	56	71	50	84	56	48	50	78	85	97
Definitely/probably will help bring solution to conflict:										
Withdraw Indian forces	69	78	66	78	83	89	62	75	83	85
Withdraw Pakistani forces	74	52	82	63	68	53	14	62	64	54
End all militant activities	71	53	77	60	72	40	27	52	75	48
War	27	40	23	34	33	46	37	44	39	66
Include all Kashmiri political opinion in talks	76	73	77	79	78	65	50	77	88	81

Table 9 cont.

	Jammu and Kashmir districts %									
	Srinagar	Jammu	Anantnag	Udhampur	Baramula	Kathua	Leh	Punch	Rajauri	Badgam	Kargil
Support removal on both sides of LoC										
All mines	88	68	82	45	78	32	78	100	100	81	86
All weapons	88	21	82	15	78	2	78	3	0	81	86
Definitely/probably will help bring solution to conflict:										
Withdraw Indian forces	94	36	88	8	96	1	40	91	100	89	42
Withdraw Pakistani forces	81	95	76	87	59	100	45	96	99	69	54
End all militant activities	84	64	98	97	91	98	81	3	0	92	87
War	3	46	1	78	*	82	3	2	0	3	0
Include all Kashmiri political opinion in talks	70	92	68	98	48	87	87	89	92	60	100

*<0.5%

9 Conclusion

The complete set of tables can be consulted on the Ipsos Mori website (http://www.ipsos-mori.com/kashmir). These summary conclusions cannot show fully the complexity of many of the opinions held in Kashmir. Opinions in some areas have polarized into different positions on either side of the Line of Control. In others the broad percentages on both sides of the LoC may be similar but mask wide geographical or social differences in attitudes.

Despite the complexity, some conclusions are clear. 81% say unemployment is the most significant problem facing Kashmiris (66% in AJK, 87% in J&K). Government corruption (22% AJK and 68% J&K), poor economic development (42% AJK, 45% J&K), human rights abuses (19% AJK, 43% J&K) and the Kashmir conflict itself (24% AJK, 36% J&K) are all seen as major problems. 80% of Kashmiris say that the dispute is very important to them personally.

The two questions envisaged under the UN resolutions of 1948/49, which proposed a plebiscite, were restricted to the choice of the whole of the former Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir joining India or joining Pakistan. This poll shows that preference for those options is highly polarized. 21% of the population said they would vote for the whole of Kashmir to join India, and 15% said they would vote for it to join Pakistan. Furthermore, only 1% of the population in AJK say they would vote to join India, while only 2% of the population in J&K say they would vote to join Pakistan. There is further polarization between the districts.

The option of independence has been widely promoted on both sides of the LoC over the last twenty years. However, although 43% of the total population said they would vote for independence, in only five out of eighteen districts was there a majority preference for the independence of the whole of Kashmir.

These results support the already widespread view that the plebiscite options are likely to offer no solution to the dispute. Nor is there evidence that an independence option could offer a straightforward alternative. Any solution will depend on the Indian and Pakistani governments' commitment to achieving a permanent settlement. The poll suggests that such a settlement will depend critically on engaging fully with all shades of Kashmiri political opinion.

The poll shows that most Kashmiris see economic problems as high on their list of priorities, most notably unemployment. Given that the conflict is likely to be exacerbating the economic problems of Kashmir, a resolution will be crucial to improving the day-to-day lives of the Kashmiri people, the vast majority of whom think, as this poll demonstrates, that the conflict is 'very important' to them personally.

Appendix

Statistical reliability

The sampling tolerances that apply to the percentage results in this survey are given in Table A1, which shows the possible variation that might be anticipated because a random sample, rather than the entire population, was interviewed. As the table indicates, sampling tolerances vary with the size of the sample and the size of percentage results.

Table A1: Approximate sampling tolerances (percentage points) applicable to percentages at or near these levels (at the 95% confidence level)

	10% or 90%	30% or 70%	50%
Base:			
3,774 (total)	+/-1	+/-1	+/-2
2,374 (Jammu & Kashmir)	+/-1	+/-2	+/-2
1,400 (Azad Kashmir)	+/-2	+/-2	+/-3
496 (Muzaffarabad)	+/-3	+/-4	+/-4
350 (Srinagar)	+/-3	+/-5	+/-5
120 (Kotli)	+/-5	+/-8	+/-9
50 (Leh)	+/-8	+/-13	+/-14

Source: Ipsos MORI

For example, for a question where 50% of the people in a sample of 3,774 respond with a particular answer, the chances are 95 in 100 that this result would not vary more than two percentage points, plus or minus, from the result that would have been obtained from a census of the entire population using the same procedures.

Tolerances are also involved in the comparison of results between different elements of the sample. A difference, in other words, must be of at least a certain size to be statistically significant. Table A2 is a guide to the sampling tolerances applicable to comparisons.

Table A2: Differences (percentage points) required for significance at the 95% confidence level at or near these percentages

	10% or 90%	30% or 70%	50%
Base			
2,374 (J&K) and 1,400 (AJK)	+/-2	+/-3	+/-3
457 (Jammu district) and 350 (Srinagar district)	+/-4	+/-6	+/-7
496 (Muzaffarabad) and 120 (Kotli)	+/-6	+/-9	+/-10
159 (Kathua) and 114 (Punch)	+/-7	+/-11	+/-12
137 (Rajauri) and 50 (Leh)	+/-10	+/-15	+/-16

Source: Ipsos MORI

Chatham House, 10 St James Square, London SW1Y 4LE
T: +44 (0)20 7957 5700 E: contact@chathamhouse.org.uk
F: +44 (0)20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org.uk

Charity Registration Number: 208223